We develop four experimental markets to examine how individuals respond to risk: self-protection and selfinsurance in both private and collective auctions. First, we find evidence that the mechanism used to reduce risk is important. Results indicate that the upper and lower bounds on value were elicited by the private selfprotection and the collective self-insurance markets. Second, the robustness of these results declined with low probability lotteries. We find further evidence that individuals overestimate the impact of low probability events. Overestimation decreased, however, with repeated market exposure. Third, the four markets induced rapid value formation. Usually only one or two additional market trials were necessary before an individual's perception and valuation of reduced risk stabilized.
Introduction
Two elements define risk: probability and severity. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) recognized that risk can be reduced by decreasing either element, privately or collectively. They define decreased probability as self-protection; decreased severity as self-insurance. Recent extensions of self-protection and self-insurance models have illustrated their wide applicability and importance to the theory of individual choice under risk [see for example Hiebert (1983) , Centner and Wetzstein (1987) , Shogren and crocker (1989a) ].
Although it is now generally recognized that self-protection and self-insurance exist, minimal attention has been given to systematically evaluating their comparative impact on individual response to risk. Given Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) work on choice under alternative decision frames, one might suspect that how a risk is reduced may be as important as what risk is reduced. The purpose of this paper is to examine how individuals respond to risk that is reduced either through private or collective self-protection or self-insurance. We construct an experimental design that incorporates self-protection and selfinsurance into four markets with alternative risk reduction mechanisms.
For each market, the experiment elicited individual valuations of four risks in both hypothetical and nonhypothetical lotteries repeated over ten market trials.
The experimental design captures three issues basic to decision making under risk. First, we examine whether the risk reduction mechanism matters to valuation. Individuals confronted with risk have an assortment of ex ante reduction mechanisms to decrease the probability or severity of an ex post monetary or nonmonetary loss. For example, an individual exposed to potentially contaminated drinking water can privately reduce the probability of illness by purchasing a water filter, or he can contribute to a collective scheme to filter the water in a centralized location. Alternatively, the individual can privately or collectively reduce the severity of the hazard through preventive medical care, nutrition, or exercise.
Although psychologists have discovered that alternative means of framing equivalent problems lead to systematic differences in choice, economists have previously not addressed whether alternative risk reduction mechanisms affect valuation.
our results suggest the mechanism matters. Reducing risk by altering the probability or severity of an undesirable event through a private mechanism induced significantly different value estimates. Private self-protection was preferred to selfinsurance. In addition, private mechanisms were valued significantly greater than the collective mechanisms for both self-protection and self-insurance. Generally, the upper bound of value is generated by the private provision of selfprotection. The lower bound of value is obtained by the collective provision of self-insurance. Consequently, future attempts to value risk should consider all alternative reduction mechanisms to capture a more comprehensive view of economic value.
The second basic issue explored is how individuals value reductions over a range of risks. Both psychologists and economists have uncovered evidence that individuals are oversensitive to changes in the probabilities of low probability events [see Machina (1983) for overview]. If individuals overestimate the value of reducing risk associated with low probability events, then more resources will be devoted to risk reduction than is economically efficient. To determine whether the subjects over estimate low probability events, a range of risks is examined. Four binary lotteries are constructed given a fixed loss and gain with probability of a loss being 1%, 10%, 20%, and 40%. To compare across lotteries, we examine the individual's risk premium payment. We also consider how the risk premiums respond to the alternative reduction mechanisms over repeated market trials.
We find further evidence that individuals overestimate the impacts of low probability events as evidenced by relatively large initial risk premium payments. The initial valuations do not conform to the expected utility requirement of linearity in probabilities as reflected by individual willingness to pay an excessive risk premium for the 1% lottery period. Although this is not encouraging since many risks are less than 1% per year or lifetime, risk premiums decrease significantly with repeated market interactions, especially in the self-insurance risk reduction markets.
Finally, the third issue examined is how value formation for risk reduction is affected by repeated exposure to the market.
It is well documented that individuals misperceive risky events in static one-shot environments. The "sharpness" of prior information about the risk has little chance to improve without sequential decisions which involve learning (see Viscusi (1979) ].
As noted by Hayek (1945) , the market provides the opportunity for an individual to update prior misperceptions since irrelevant information has been forced out. Given one can discriminate between self-protection and selfinsurance expenditures, is one reduction scheme preferred to another? current economic theory yields an ambiguous answer. Boyer and Dionne (1983) argue that a risk averse consumer will always prefer private self-insurance to self-protection since the former is more efficient in reducing an equivalent risk.
According to Chang and Ehrlich (1985) , however, self-insurance will not be preferred to self-protection since both must be equally desirable in terms of marginal contribution to expected utility. In our experimental design, the individual purchasing self-protection is guaranteed a monetarY gain, while the purchaser of self-insurance is not. Self-protection reduces the probability of a loss to zero, implying a 100% chance of receiving the gain. Self-insurance, however, reduces the severity of the probable loss to zero, but does not alter the probability of receiving the monetarY gain. Therefore, a riskaverse or risk-neutral individual will value self-protection more highly than self-insurance [see Shogren (1988) for the proof].
In terms of private versus collective risk reduction, if the individual can always produce a given reduction at less cost privately than collectively, he will do so [see Shogren and Crocker (1989b) ]. The individual's preference for collective or private reduction will depend on the perceived productivity of. Machina (1982 Machina ( , 1983 , Covello (1984) ].
Studies have found individuals oversensitive to changes in the probability of low risk events, and undersensitive to high risk events (e.g., Fischhoff et al. (1984) , Viscusi and Magat (1987) ].
This violation is particularly damaging since it implies non- (1 -~) is the probability of a monetary gain $G. In each experimental market, subjects were asked to report separate bids stating the maximum he or she would be willing to pay to reduce four levels of risk (1%, 10%, 20%, 40%).
The third issue in experimental design is to consider how individual values respond to repeated exposure to self-protection and self-insurance opportunities. Expenditures to reduce risk are rarely in terms of one-shot lifetime contributions. An individual's first market expenditure is often significantly different from his last. The first expenditure is based on prior information that is often incorrect. From a Bayesian perspective, repeated exposure to the market will allow the individual to update his perception and, therefore, his value of a reduction in risk [see Viscusi (1979) ]. A market influences individual learning of value due to the learning-feedback environment of a repetitive framework. Therefore, to determine how multiple market exposure to alternative risk reduction mechanisms affects value formation, we explore the dynamics of repeated market trials compared to a static one-shot response.
The experiment began by eliciting an inexperienced hypothetical bid (UEHB) for each level of risk. The UEHB bid was not binding, did not influence take-home pay, and the lotteries were not resolved. Next, ten nonhypothetical bids were elicited in sequentially repeated trials for each risk (Tl-TlO). These ten bids were binding, did influence take-home pay, and the lotteries were resolved. Finally, an experienced hypothetical bid (EHB) was obtained. In all each subject reported 48 bids. 
Experimental Results
One hundred and twenty subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were recruited from the undergraduate program at Appalachian state University. 2 Five experiment sessions with six subjects each were run for each of the four asset markets. 
Risk Valuation Is sensitive to the Risk Reduction Mechanism
To examine the impact of alternative risk reduction mechanisms we first compare the private and collective markets, and then compare the self-protection and self-insurance markets.
The private risk reduction markets were organized as a Vickrey sealed-bid second-price auction [Vickrey (1961) ]. Each subject competes for the purchase of protection or insurance. The winner is the subject with the highest bid who pays the second highest bid for a 100% reduction in risk.
Both the winner and second bid were posted as the only public information for each auction.
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The collective risk reduction markets were organized as modified sealed-bid Smith Auctions (Smith (1980) we did not accept the hypothesis that the mean EHB bid for the respective private risk reduction through self-protection or self-insurance were derived from the same parental distribution as the collective reductions. willing to pay more for the private mechanism that influenced probability than the mechanism that influenced severity. This result contradicts Boyer and Dionne's (1983) claim that private self-insurance will be preferred to self-protection. The result supports Shogren's (1988) argument that since self-protection guarantees a monetary gain, it will be preferred to selfinsurance, which only guarantees that one will not suffer a loss.
Respondents were not willing to pay more, however, for collective mechanisms that influence probability relative to severity. A Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates the experienced hypothetical bids for collective self-protection are not statistically significant from collective self-insurance for all probability periods.
In general, the mechanism, whether private or collective or whether probability or severity is reduced, is important when eliciting an economic value for a reduction in risk. Our results indicate the upper bound on value was the private, selfprotection market. The lower bound on value was the collective, self-insurance market.
The disparity in private and collective values may be due to the free-riding incentive in the collective mechanism.
Individuals have an incentive to under-report willingness to pay for nonhypothetical reduced risk. 7 As noted by Bennett (1987) , strategic behavior between collective bidders often occurs in Smith Auctions even though collective optimality is attained.
Smith {1980) found that although optimal aggregate levels of public good were provided, it was often only because the underreported values were balanced by overreported values. This balancing-out phenomena was also observed in our experimental markets. A larger proportion of subjects bid over expected consumer surplus than below. However, this proportion declined over repeated market exposure.
The results have implications on the mechanism used to elicit individual preferences for reduced risk. Traditionally, the mechanism is a collective scheme in which an agency exogenously reduces a risk if the sum of individual payments (i.e., higher taxes, group fund) exceeds the costs of reduction (e.g., Weinstein et al. (1980) , Smith and Desvousges (1987)] . A large number of risks, however, can be reduced privately through self-protection or self-insurance mechanisms. By allowing private risk reduction, our results indicate that traditional use of collective mechanisms may in fact only be a lower bound on the economic value of a reduction in risk.
overestimation of Low Risks Declines with Repeated Market Trials
To determine if respondents in the experimental asset markets overemphasize small probabilities and underemphasize large probabilities, we examine the individual's risk preference in terms of a risk premium. A risk premium is the amount above expected consumer surplus the risk averse individual is willing to pay ex ante to eliminate the risk of losing $L of their assets.
If the individual overemphasizes small probabilities, then the risk premium for eliminating a 1% probability of a loss should exceed the risk premiums for a 10%, 20% and 40% probability. Table 4 reports the summary statistic for the four asset markets over the four levels of risk. The individual is risk averse (neutral/lover) if the ratio of bid to expected consumer surplus is greater (equal to/less) than unity.
Respondents were initially extremely risk averse, overestimating the 1% probability of a loss in the initial inexperienced hypothetical bid. With repeated market exposure through ten nonhypothetical trials, however, the overestimation declined, especially in the self-insurance markets. Although the risk premium for the 1% probability for the self-protection experienced hypothetical bids is still larger than the other levels of risk, oversensitivity declines rapidly with market experience.
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The result supports Plott and Sunder's (1982) argument that for a well-defined, mature market environment, expected utility is "not universally misleading about the nature of human capabilities and markets" (p. 692).
The observed tendency to overestimate low probability events has led to safety and health regulations that promote hazard warnings as regulatory alternatives to direct constraints on use or availability [see Viscusi et al. (1986) ]. The evidence indicates the overall efficacy of hazard warnings is governed not only by the risk level, but also by the information content. Our experiments indicate that the self-insurance markets disseminated information such that consumer valuations were broadly consistent with rational behavior. In both the private and collective selfinsurance markets, strict privacy with public information only about the market was sufficient to produce rational behavior.
Irrelevant or nonefficient information was forced out of the market. As Hayek (1945) doing so a more comprehensive view of value will be obtained.
In addition, the four reduction mechanisms with immediate market information feedback induced rapid learning and decreased misperception of risk. Usually value formation was complete after one or two additional market trials. Note, however, the robustness of these results declined during the 1% lottery period. The addition of repeated trials, however, still induced value formation to a degree closer to that predicted by expected utility theory, especially in the self-insurance markets that focused on the reduction of severity. Footnotes 1. The experimental design follows that of Schulze et al. (1986) . Schulze et al., however, only consider one of the four markets described in this paper, private self-insurance.
2. Bennett (1987) found student responses statistically insignificant from respondents representative of the general population. This suggests experimentation may be "satisfactorily performed using student groups" (p. 367). As such, the Vickrey auction completes the identification of Smith's (1982) triad of components specific to behavior: the environment (including values), the instrument or institution, and the actual observed behavior.
6.
Communication among subjects is forbidden. The experimenter sets the costs $C of 100% risk reduction equal to the sum of expected consumer surplus given the lottery period. Costs were not posted. The smith Auction process was modified in three ways: (i) given a 100% risk reduction, subjects were not asked to provide bids for the quantity of collective good, (ii) no rebate rule was used, and (iii) there was no stopping rule after unanimous agreement; all 12 auctions were completed.
7. Note this incentive to understate willingness to pay is due to the nonhypothetical nature of the ten market trials. The subject's take-home pay was determined by his or her bids. In hypothetical markets where subjects do not actually pay for protection or insurance, then one might find results to support the old notion that individuals overstate their bids to bias the results toward certain provision of the public good. Since the individuals do not actually pay anything, then they have an incentive to overstate their preferences. our results indicate that given repeated nonhypothetical market exposure, there was no overstating on the final experienced hypothetical bid (EHB) . The EHB bid behaved similarly to the nonhypothetical bids (T1-T10).
8. Kunreuther et al. (1985) noted the substantial empirical evidence suggesting individuals are unwilling to insure or protect themselves against low probability/high severity events.
In light of this finding, our results support a notion of preference reversal in that the willingness to pay a risk premium was the highest for the low probability lottery. Yet apparently this behavior is reversed in real-world risks such as seat belts and federally subsidized flood insurance [Kunreuther et al. (1985) ].
9. The speed of convergence could be dependent on the parameters of the experimental market. However, in other experimental contexts, a parameter such as group size has had mixed results in altering the speed of convergence. For example, Smith (1982) notes that allocations and prices converge to predicted competitive equilibrium outcomes within three to four trading periods or less. This result holds with as few as six to eight buyers and as few as two sellers [Propositions 4 and 5, p. 945].
10. Lattimore et al. (1988) found that the expected utility model did not fare well in comparison to the probabilitytransform model of Yaari (1987) . However, their experiment was designed as a one~shot decision problem. The subjects did not have an opportunity to learn from repeated action in the market.
consequently, there was no opportunity to update incorrect prior perceptions of risk. NOTE: We do not accept the null hypothesis that the population mean is zero at the .01 level using a one-tailed test for all UEHB, ANB, and EHB bids across asset markets and lottery periods. • -E(CS) represents expected consumer surplus E(CSJ = $1, $.5, $.05, and $2 for probability = 20%, 10%, 1%, and 40%.
b SP: Private Self-Protection, SI: Private Self-Insurance CSP: Collective Self-Protection, CSI: Collective Self-Insurance c-MeanjE(CSJ > 1(=1/ < 1) implies risk aversion (neutrality/lover). over the course of the experiment, you will be asked to bid your maximum willingness to pay to prevent a loss of $4 for a series of different probability periods (40%, 20%, 10%, and 1%).
For example, given an initial starting income of $10, if there is a 60% chance that you will gain $1, and a 40% chance that you will lose $4, what is the maximum you would be willing to pay to guarantee a 100% chance of winning $1 and a 0% chance of losing $4?
There will be ten bidding trials in each probability period. Note that for each trial the starting income will always be $10. Your gains or losses'do not carry over to the next trial or probability period.
Each participant is competing to purchase the right to protect him/herself from a certain probability of a $4 loss. The participant with the highest willingness to pay bid wins this right of protect~on ~nd will be guaranteed a 0% chance of a $4 loss and a 100% chance of a $1 gain. The highest bidder must in all cases pay the bid of the second highest bidder. All other participants are then subject to a random draw to determine if a loss or gain occurs. Note that in the event that there is a tie for the highest bid, those participants will be asked to rebid.
The actual experiment will proceed as follows:
Step 1:
At the beginning of the experiment you will state a separate hypothetical bid for reducing each of the four probabilities of a loss to zero.
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 6:
The experimenter selects a probability period.
Ten bidding trials will be run for the selected probability period.
At the beginning of each bidding trial for a given probability period, you will state a bid by writing it on the recording card. Note that your initial income remains at $10 for each trial regardless of your winnings or losses in the trial periods before.
·After the recording card has been collected from each participant, the experimenter will display the winner (the highest bidder) and the price of protection on the blackboard. The winner must pay the displayed price of protection.
The experimenter will then draw one chip from the urn.
A white chip results in a $1 gain for everyone, a red 30 protect him/herself from a certain probability of a $4 loss. The participant with the highest willingness to pay bid wins this right of protect~on ~nd will be guaranteed a O% chance of a $4 loss and a 100% chance of a $1 gain. The highest bidder must in all cases pay the bid of the second highest bidder. All other participants are then subject to a random draw to determine if a loss or gain occurs. Note that in the event that there is a tie for the highest bid, those participants will be asked to rebid.
After the recording card has been collected from each participant, the experimenter will display the winner (the highest bidder) and the price of protection on the blackboard. The winner must pay the displayed price of protection.
A white chip results in a $1 gain for everyone, a red Steo 7:
Step 8:
chip results in a $4 loss for everyone (except the highest bidder) • After ten trial periods, a final hypothetical bid will be elicited for the probability period.
The process will repeat until all four probability periods have been examined. Your take home income will consist of your initial income plus or minus your gains, losses, and purchases of protection.
Are there any questions?
